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SURFACE MINING AND THE CONTINUING BATTLE
BETWEEN SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE PROPERTY

OWNERS: A LOOK AT SOUTH DAKOTA MINING
ASSOCIATION V. LA WRENCE COUNTY
KEVIN J. SMITH*

In the United States, land may be horizontally severed into
surface and subsurface estates so that legal title to multiple land strata
vests in different owners. Consequently, millions of acres of land are
owned by parties who have no control or rights in the subsurface
property estate.' For example, a mining company may obtain title to a
subsurface estate while a private landowner, or governmental entity,
retains ownership of the subsurface estate. This approach to property
law is thought to provide efficiencies because the surface and
subsurface owners can concentrate on attaining optimal use of the
estates or properties.2
This article examines a conflict that occurs between the owners
of these properties. The issue is whether a surface property owner can
prevent surface mining by the subsurface property owner. Historically,
courts have resolved this issue by designating the subsurface estate
dominant and the surface estate subservient so that the mineral owner
receives an easement encompassing as much of the surface estate as is
reasonable to extract the minerals.3 Even with the restriction of what is
'reasonably necessary,' surface property owners have historically had
their estates substantially or completely destroyed.4 In recent years,

B.S., Eastern Montana College; .J.D., University of South Dakota.
See J. Stephen Dycus, LegislativeClarijficationof the CorrelativeRights of Surface
and Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871, 872 (1980).
2
See Cyril A. Fox, Jr., Private Mining Law in the 1980's: The Last Ten Years and
Beyond, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 795, 818 (1990) (referring to the surface estate as a remainder interest
because the surface estate will expand to encompass both the surface and subsurface estates once
the mineral estate terminates, unless the parties have agreed otherwise).
See 58 C.J.S. Mines andMinerals§ 159 (1998); see also Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422
S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App. 1967) (explaining the traditional relationship between dominant mineral
owner and the subservient surface property owner).
4
See MacDonald v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d 311, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1942) (finding that a
mineral owner's right to make reasonably necessary use of the subsurface property includes the
right to wholly destroy the surface, if such destruction occurs as a result of usual or customary
method of mining); Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Ky. 1956) (allowing surface
mining to go forward by focusing analysis on the dominance of the mineral estate rather that on
the intent of parties to allow certain types of mining); Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So.2d
553, 555 (Miss. 1962) (agreeing that mineral estate owner'3 right to extract minerals by usual and
customary methods exists even though the surface of the ground may be completely destroyed
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through federal and state regulations, legislators have addressed this

problem by giving surface property owners more control in an attempt
to equalize the power of the two estates. 5
This article will discuss some of the avenues that surface
owners and local governments can explore to deter surface mining on6
their property. In South Dakota Mining Ass 'n v. Lawrence County,
both the surface and subsurface property was owned by separate
landowners.7 Neither the surface nor subsurface estates were federally
owned, managed or leased, so the Mining Law of 1872 did not apply.
The surface estate was owned by private citizens and the subsurface
estate by various mining companies. 9
In South Dakota Mining, the citizens of Lawrence County
passed a zoning ordinance prohibiting any new surface mining within
the county on both federally and privately owned land.' 0 The section of
the county involved in this case included parts of the Black Hills
National Forest. The court in South Dakota Mining addressed the issue
of the ordinance interfering with mining operations on federal lands in
the national forest, but specifically refused to address the issue of the
Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance's status as pertaining to privately
owned land that is scattered within the national forest."
The specific issue of the zoning ordinance's status pertaining
to privately owned land raised in South Dakota Mining Ass 'n will be
addressed in this article, as well as the basic conflict between the

as a result thereof); see also Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979)
(establishing a reasonableness test).
See Clyde 0. Martz, The New Model Surface Use and Mineral Development
Accommodation Act, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 30, 31 (Winter 1991). See, e.g.. 16 U.S.C. §
460m-19(1998) (prohibits surface mining within boundaries of national rivers); 16 U.S.C. § 469
(1998) (preserving historical and archeological sites); Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16
U.S.C. §§ 475, 551 (1998) (giving the Forest Service authority to regulate mining activities to
prevent undue degradation or damage to surface resources). The first Act to halt the depletion of
certain resources was the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. See 30 U.S.C. § 185 et. seq. (1998).
6155 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1998).
7
See id. at 1007.
8See id. at 1011, citing General Mining Law of 1872,30 U.S.C. § 21 (1998). Federal
land includes all classes of land owned by the federal government. The term 'public lands' means
any land or interest in land owned by the United States. South Dakota is one of twenty states
known as a public land state. Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Public Land
Statistics 1990, 128 (G.P.O.: 1991-573-003/42001).
9
See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 1007.
"°See id.
IISee id. at 1011 (stating the defendant did not raise the issue so the court would
not
answer this question).
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surface and subsurface property owners concerning surface mining.
Because the Court settled the issue of mining on federal lands in this
case, this article will concentrate on the effect of the ordinance on the
non-federally owned lands. The issue will certainly become more
contentious as cities grow and mining moves off federal and public
lands.
When any discussion about laws prohibiting mining occurs, one
must address the issue of preemption. Section I of this article addresses
that important aspect of property rights. It examines possible federal
and state preemption issues. An equally important aspect of property
rights is addressed in Section II -- the question of takings. In South
Dakota Mining Ass 'n, a taking could occur by the Lawrence County
Zoning Ordinance. Section III discusses possible applications of private
and public nuisance actions pertaining to surface mining. Finally,
Section IV offers a conclusion of the issues presented in this article.
I. PREEMPTION

A. Federal Law
In South DakotaMining, the court held that the Mining Act of
1872 preempted the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance as it pertained
to federally owned land.' 2 The Mining Act of 1872 has imposed greater
restrictions upon local governmental control of surface mining on
federally owned land than on privately owned land. This is primarily
due to two Constitutional requirements. First, the Property Clause gives
Congress the power to dispose of, make rules for, and regulate the
territory belonging to the United States. 13 The second requirement is
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution which gives Congress sole
authority over the use of federally owned land. 4 In this case, the
federally owned land in question is the Black Hills National Forest.' 5
Understanding that these two clauses work together in
determining preemption issues is important. When Congress acts
12See id. at 1010; 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1999) (stating "[Except as otherwise provided,] All
valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States ... are hereby declared to be
to exploration and purchase.").
free and open
13U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,543 (1976)
(stating that Congress retains the power to enact needful legislation which protects, regulates, and
respects public lands).

'See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.

15See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 1007.
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pursuant to the Property Clause, federal law will override conflicting
state law under the Supremacy Clause.16 Thus the Supreme Court has
held that the power entrusted to Congress over the public lands is
without limitation. 7 Congress' authority is complete even if those lands
are within the boundaries of a local government like Lawrence

County.' 8
The only avenue a local government has in regulating surface
mining on federally owned land is passing a zoning ordinance that does
not interfere with the purpose of the Mining Act of 1872.'9 If the local
zoning ordinance goes too far, then the courts will deem it preempted.
If the local government regulates surface mining on privately owned
land, the Mining Act of 1872 is not applicable; however, other federal
acts do apply.2" Whether on federal or privately owned land, the same
approach is used to determine whether a local or state law is preempted.
There are different approaches used by the courts to decide
whether a local zoning ordinance or state law has hindered the purpose
of the federal law. The leading type of preemption is conflict
preemption. A conflict exists when the ordinance or state law stands as
an obstacle to the purpose and objectives of the federal law.21 Pursuant
to the Supremacy Clause, local or state law is preempted when it
interferes with or directly contradicts a federal law.22 If a hindrance or
23
conflict exists, the local ordinance is deemed to be "without effect."
The lines of inquiry are identical whether a local zoning
ordinance or state law is being scrutinized against the preemptive
force.24 Federal preemption will not only preempt a local or state law

'176See

Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
See id. at 529.
' See Kenneth E. Barnhill & Diane Sawaya-Barnes, The Role of Local Government
in Mineral Development, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 221, 235 (1983).
' 9See JOHN D. LESHEY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION (1986)
(discussing2indetail mining on federal lands).
2
2 1See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 101 I.
See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,284 (1995); ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas,
807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941); See also
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 913 P.2d 1141 (Idaho 1996) (declaring ordinances
that attempted
22 to challenge the federal authority to manage public lands were preempted).
See Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 1992)(quoting Hayfield N. R.R.
Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622, 627 (1984)).
zJ.Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(citing
Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
24
See Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 905 F.Supp. 371, 377
(E.D. Tex. 1995)(citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638
(1973); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1504 n.4 (I0th Cir.
8
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when the two are plainly contradictory, but also when the
incompatibilities between the laws are discernable through inference.2 5
In South DakotaMiningAss 'n, the court declared the Lawrence County
Zoning Ordinance to be in direct conflict with the purpose of the
Federal Mining Act of 1972 as pertaining to the federally owned land.
Therefore the local ordinance was preempted. 26 The court did not,
however, answer the question of preemption of the Lawrence County
Zoning Ordinance as it pertained to privately owned land.27
When a local government tries to regulate strip mining on
privately owned land, the local government must determine if the
28
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA")
has preempted their action. When determining whether SMCRA
preempts local or state law, a court should examine the text and
structure of the law to determine if it is the clear purpose of Congress
to preempt an area of state or local law.29 In addition, a court must look
to the federal law as a whole as well as the law's objectives and
motivations.30 Congress enacted SMCRA to protect citizens and the
environment from the harmful effects of surface mining, and to
encourage efficient and ecologically sound surface mining. 3' These
that they are fully
protections include assuring surface landowners
32
protected from such mining operations.
If local governments have the power to control post mining
land uses, then logically they also must have the power to control the
initial location of the mining. Since in South Dakota Mining property
was not disturbed, the more appropriate issue becomes the protections
afforded to surface property owners before mining operations begin.

1994).
(1984).

25See Hayfield No. R.R. Co. v. Chicago
& N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622, 627
26

See South Dakota Mining
Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 101.
See id.
2830 U.S.C. §§ 1201. (1998).
29
See Peters v. Union Pac. R.R., 80 F.3d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1996).
3
°See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
31See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (f) (1999); 30 U.S.C. § 1201(j), (k) (1999). But see Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (upholding
it did not commandeer the states into regulating mining).
SMCRA because
32
See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1999). See generally Richard Roth et al., Coal Mining
Subsidence Regulation in Six Appalachian States, 10 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 311, 324-42 (1991)
(concluding that the treatment problems falling under SMCRA differ from state to state because
of variations in political and economic clout of the mining industry to that of the surface owners).
27

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[VOL 15:1

It is argued that local governments should have the power to
control the location of surface mines for several reasons. First, local
ordinances or state laws that regulate the initial location of surface
mines are not inconsistent with SMCRA. The Act declares that
"existing state or local use plans or programs" must be consulted in
determining which areas should be deemed unsuitable for mining.33
Thus, SMCRA indicates that local zoning ordinances should be
followed.
The Act states that more stringent state or local ordinances are
not necessarily preempted.34 If a local government enacts a zoning
ordinance such as that in Lawrence County which controls the initial
35
location of a surface mine, it should not be preempted by SMCRA.
South Dakota already prohibits new surface mining permits on private
land in the Spearfish Canyon area of Lawrence County.36 Third, there
is no actual conflict between the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance
and SMCRA, because SMCRA is more of an environmental act than a
land use act. Lastly, local governments should retain the power to
control the location of surface mine placements because the location of
a surface mine requires a balancing of uniquely local interests.37
Even with the provision mentioned above, there has been little
discussion via case law about whether SMCRA or its state law
counterparts preempt local governments from prohibiting surface
mining. Furthermore, the responsibility of authorizing and enforcing
regulations regarding surface mining rests with the state or local
governments. 38 As a result, one may conclude that states, and thus local
governments, can be more stringent in prohibiting surface mining
without being preempted by SMCRA. In addition, the little authority
that does exist indicates that local governments will not be preempted
from enacting such ordinances in every situation.39

3330 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(A) (1999).
34
See 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (1999).
35
See 30 C.F.R. §§ 901-950 (1998) (describing that when SMCRA was enacted,
Congress looked at the various state laws and either pronoun ced them more stringent and
allowable or preempted). See e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 941.700 (1998) (describing South Dakota's laws
in relation to
36 SMCRA).
See S.D.CODIFIED LAWS § 45-6B- 104 (Michie 1999); See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 45-6B- 105 (Michie 1999) (describing the legal description of area).
37See Leslie E. Renkey, Local Zoning ofStrip Mining, 57 KY. L.J. 738, 746-48 (1969).
3
8See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1999).
39
See Laura A. Lane, Comment, Local Land Use Policiesin the Reclamation ofStip
Mining Land, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 598-601,604-19 (1980); see also Jonathan Belcher, Exploring
the Latitude of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Local Control ofSurface Mining, 17
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B. State Law Preemption
If SMCRA does not preempt Lawrence County from passing
local zoning ordinances, then the last obstacles are any existing state
laws that would prohibit local governments from enacting such
legislation. The federal government permits a state to regulate surface
mining, through SMCRA, on non-federal lands within its borders so
long as it has an approved state program. 40 Twenty-four states have
established state surface mining programs. 4' Only a few states that
have enacted surface mining statutes preempt local governments from
the regulation of surface mining. For example, Alabama's SMCRA
provides that local, municipal and county regulation of surface mining
is preempted.42 Courts have upheld the abilities of local governments
in Pennsylvania to enact only zoning regulations that control surface
mining.4 3 Consequently, even states that restrict local regulation still
permit zoning restrictions like the one enacted in South DakotaMining
Ass'n.
The vast majority of state SMCRAs closely follow the language
of the federal SMCRA. The surface mining acts of Kentucky and
Virginia are good examples. 44 Kentucky and Virginia have not
preempted local governments in these states from implementing land

WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 165, 173 (1993) (arguing the logic of local ordinances not being
preempted b SMCRA).
"See 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1998) (establishing seven requirements fora state program
to receive Department of Interior approval: [i] state law must be in compliance with SMCRA, [2]
state law providing sanctions for violations must be in accordance with SMCRA, [3] state has an
agency competent to administer such law, [4] state has law authorizing permits, [5] law provides
for identifying lands unsuitable for mining, [6] there are procedures for coordinating when
multiple permitting agencies are involved, and [7] all rules and regulations are in accordance with
SMCRA); 30 C.F.R. § 731.14 (1998) (identifying that information to be included in state
programs). See also Power River Basin Resource Council v. Babbit, 54 F.3d 1477 (10th Cir.
1995) (detailing Wyoming's deficiency in its state program leading to the Department of Interior's
disapproval.
See C.F.R. §§ 901,902,904,906,913-18,920,924-26,931,934-36,
938,943,944,
948, 950 (1998).
42
See ALA. CODE § 9-16-106 (1999).
43See Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219, 225-26 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991); McClimans v. Board of Supervisors, 529 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987).
'See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350.010-.990 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); VA. CODE ANN.
45.1-226 to 270.7 (Michie 1998).
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use ordinances controlling the location of surface mines.45 Local
governments in Kentucky also may play a role in controlling post
mining use of the land.46
The ability of a local government to regulate surface mining on
privately owned land depends upon the text of its state's SMCRA. In
states like Alabama and Pennsylvania, which have more restrictive
preemption provisions, municipalities have less power to regulate. But
in Kentucky and Virginia, the state surface mining acts essentially
follow the language of the federal SMCRA, and do not expressly
preempt local government regulation. In most states, local governments
do not appear to be preempted from passing non-conflicting land use
ordinances, particularly those which control the location of a surface
mine. 7
If the state has not enacted a surface mining act, like South
Dakota, then the provisions of the federal SMCRA control. 48 In
addition, this requires the Office of Surface Reclamation and
Enforcement to develop a program for these states.49 South Dakota is
one of the states that has had a federal program developed.5" These
federal programs closely follow SMCRA.5"
There is no indication from SMCRA that federal law has
preempted local governments from controlling the initial location of
surface mining activities on privately owned lands. Furthermore, there
is no indication that SMCRA precludes local governments from
controlling the regulation of post mining use of land, and it is likely that

45See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.610(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §
45.1-252(A)(4) (Michie 1998); see also Carolyn S. Bratt, Surface Miningin Kentucky, 71 KY. L.J.
7,21-22 (1982) (discussing the Kentucky statute). In Kentucky, reservation of mineral rights does
not include the right to surface mining. United States v. Steams Co., 949 F.2d 223,226 (6th Cir.
1991).
'See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.405 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
47See ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, THE LAWOFZONING AND PLANNING§ 31.03[1 3) (Edward

H. Zeigler, Jr. ed., 1991).

4See Zoning Ordinance for Mining Operation, Op. S.D. Att'y Gen. No. 86-04 (Mar.

3, 1986).
49

see 30 U.S.C. §§ 1211 (a), 1254(a) (1999); 30 C.F.R. § 730.12(a) (1999); see also
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 198 1) (providing
a framework for the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement's [OSM] general
rulemaking50ability).
The states which have had a federal program developed for them are California,
Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 905, 910, 912, 921, 933, 937, 939, 941,942, 947
(1998).
5

JSee 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (1999).
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SMCRA would not deem these controls inconsistent if they were more
stringent than the federal regulation.
If SMCRA, or any other state provision, has not preempted the
Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance, then the courts should conclude
that the ordinance should stand on the preemption issue. As previously
mentioned, South Dakota has already enacted laws prohibiting surface
mining in Lawrence County.52 The next question is whether the zoning
ordinance amounts to a taking.

II. TAKINGS: How FAR CAN A LOCAL GOVERNMENT Go?
As discussed in the previous section, local governments are
able to regulate the activities of surface mining operations. This section
will discuss how far local governments can go under the takings clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the similar clauses in the
states' constitutions.
There are several methods by which local governments can
regulate surface mining. The most common way is by zoning. Local
governments can prohibit some or all types of mining. In addition to
zoning, local governments can regulate surface mining through
licensing or post-mining reclamation. Finally, a local government can
also enact "mineral ordinances" that guide the mining process;
however, this type of ordinance is more susceptible to preemption than
traditional zoning.54
An issue that the courts in South DakotaMining did not address
was whether the ordinance passed by Lawrence County voters was
viewed as a zoning or a mineral ordinance. 55 Since the Lawrence
County ordinance regulates zoning, its chance of survival increases. As
a result, it seems likely the courts will, and should, take the view that
the Lawrence County ordinance is a zoning ordinance. In other words,
it should be upheld. The ability of local governments to control surface
mining using zoning ordinances is discussed in the next section.

52

See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 1007.
See Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F.Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn.
1980) (stating that SMCRA does not violate the Fifth or Tenth Amendments 'reserved powers'
provision). 54 See id.
53

55See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 1007 (stating the ordinance: "No new
permits or amendments to existing permits may be issued for surface metal mining extractive
industry projects in the spearfish canyon area.").
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A. Zoning
The question is whether Lawrence County is permitted to enact
zoning ordinances regulating the location of surface mining. This issue
is separate from preemption, because even if a county ordinance is not
preempted, it still must be authorized by the state. In South Dakota
Mining, the voters passed the zoning ordinance, not Lawrence County
itself.5 6 This presents a slightly different issue, but the county still must
be able to enact the ordinances regardless. In South Dakota, counties
are permitted to enact zoning regulations. 7 All state zoning statutes are
patterned after the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which courts
construe as implicitly authorizing zoning ofnatural resources, including
coal. Some states have included express language authorizing such
zoning.
Zoning ordinances that regulate surface mining have been
challenged frequently as "takings" of private property without just
compensation, especially where they prohibit surface mining from
occurring anywhere within the locality. 58 The courts have long
recognized surface mining as a legitimate use of land, and it generally
cannot be constitutionally prohibited. 9 Zoning ordinances which
prevent mining are invalid unless very serious consequences would
result from the proposed mining. 60 The destruction of the surface
owners' property may logically be considered a serious consequence.
In addition, the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance only prohibits
surface mining, not subsurface mining operations.
Even local zoning ordinances that restrict but do not prohibit
surface mining have also been heavily contested.6' This is exactly what
the zoning ordinance in South Dakota MiningAss 'n does. 62 It prohibits
surface mining only on federally and privately owned land within

56

See id.
"See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11 -2-2 (Michie 1998).
58See East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 143 N.E.2d 309, 311 (Ohio 1957); Exton
Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 179-82 (Pa. 1967) (holding that
municipal ordinances
prohibiting rock quarrying were unconstitutionally exclusionary).
59
See Lower Allen Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Lower Allen Township Zoning
Hearing Bd 500 A.2d 1253, 1260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
6See
Silva v. Ada Township, 330 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Mich. App. 1983).
61
See D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Prohibitingor Regulating Removal or Exploitation
of Oil and Gas, Minerals,Soil, or Other Natural Productswithin MunicipalLimits, 10 A.L.R. 3d
1226

(19980

See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d
at 1007.
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40,000 acres of the county.63 Surface mining may not, however, be
prohibited where it will do no harm, or where it is shown that the value
of the land will be greater if mined.' A successful challenge to the
Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance must show the existence of
valuable amounts of coal on the land, and prove that no serious
consequences would result from the surface mining of coal.65 Serious
consequences do not include generated truck traffic, attendant noise, or
decreased property value in the area. 66 Nevertheless, as mentioned
above, substantial damage to the surface owners' property would be
taken into consideration.67
Unless the severance of the surface from the subsurface estates
included the right of the subsurface property owner to significantly
damage the surface estate, courts will not permit the destruction of the
surface estate. 68 Even if the subsurface property estate has the explicit
right to destroy the surface estate, courts may require whichever mining
method best preserves the surface estate.69
In addition to considering the damage to the surface estate, if
Lawrence County were planning residential development in the area,
the zoning ordinance might be upheld to protect that planned use of the
land.7 ° On its face, the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance is
permissible as a zoning ordinance, and surface property owners may
prohibit the surface mining. But does this zoning ordinance completely
devalue the subsurface property?
B. The Takings Claim
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use without just

63

See id. (referring to the fact that ninety percent of the area in question is part of the
Black Hills National Forest, with the remaining ten percent being privately owned land mixed
within the national forest).
64
1953).
275, 287 (I11.
65See Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 115 N.E.2d
See American Aggregates Corp. v. Highland Township, 390 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1986).

id.
'See
67

See People v. Hawley, 279 P. 136, 144 (Cal. 1929).
See Stewart v. Chernick, 266 A.2d 259, 263 (Pa. 1978).
69
See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Limited Corp., 951 F.2d 110, 113-114(6th
Cir. 1991) (stating the dominant estate is liable to the subservient estate for action known or
expected to7 0cause damage).
See Harbucks v. Board of Supervisors of Nockamixon Center Hill, 560 A.2d 85 1,
854 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
68
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compensation."'" In South Dakota Mining, a regulatory taking is
implicated." Initially, the Takings Clause was construed only as a
protection against the physical appropriation of private property by the
government. However, the Supreme Court has come to recognize that
government regulations can have the same effect. The question then
becomes whether the regulation goes so far as to render the owner's
property useless. If so, then a taking has occurred and the private
landowner will most likely lose the property, with just compensation.
As held in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council73 and other
cases, property owners should expect their property to be regulated to
a certain degree. To determine when a regulation has gone too far, but
has not completely devalued the property, some courts have applied a
balancing test. Others use a harm/benefit analysis. In recent years, the
Supreme Court and a growing number of states and federal courts have
come to favor a two-part test if the property in question had been
completely devalued of all economic use.74 Under this two-part test the
private property owner must show either (1) that the zoning ordinance
does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or (2) that it
denies the owner all economically viable use of his or her land.75
In order to meet the first prong of the test -- showing a
legitimate state interest -- the subsurface estate owner must prove that
the zoning ordinance is not related to the public's safety, health, morals,
or general welfare.76 Put simply, the zoning ordinance must serve the
public interests which it purports to promote. Courts have repeatedly
upheld zoning ordinances prohibiting surface mining when such
ordinances relate to preserving safety, health and the general welfare.77
These zoning ordinances are upheld even if the property owner suffers
economic hardship or loss of profits.7" The critical determination is
whether the prohibition on surface mining furthers legitimate public
safety, health, or general welfare issues.7 9 Cases on this issue suggest
that a court will uphold a zoning ordinance if it bans surface mining

71U.S. CONST. amend.
V.

72See South Dakota Mining Ass'n, 155 F.3d at 1007.
73505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
74

See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
75See id.
76
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicits, 480 U.S. 470,487-88 (1987).
77See Ytreberg, supra note 59.
78See id.

79See McClimans v. Board of Supervisors, 529 A.2d 562,568 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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near populated areas.8 ° On the other hand, if the ordinance bans surface
mining in relatively unpopulated areas, where little possibility of
danger exists, it is less likely to be upheld.8
In South Dakota Mining Ass 'n, the court did not define the
public interests. If the Mining Association succeeded in proving the
Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance is unrelated or insufficiently
related to public interest, the ordinance would be defined as a "taking"
of the Mining Association's property. On the other hand, if the
ordinance were supported by legitimate public interest, it would be a
valid exercise of the police power. The ultimately determinative factor
will most likely be the fact that the Black Hills National Forest is
primarily unpopulated and far from any populated areas.
If Lawrence County can satisfy the first prong of the test by
demonstrating legitimate state interests, the zoning ordinance may still
be a "taking" if it denies the Mining Association all economic use of the
property. To be a taking under Lucas, the Supreme Court held that the
private landowner must be left undeveloped.8 2 But Lucas did not alter
any earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning government
regulations on the use of property that diminishes the value of that
property, but did not totally eliminate its value. When a local
government deprives the property owner of some of the value of his
property but the action does not constitute a total elimination of the
value of the property, the question of whether the government action
constitutes a taking requiring compensation must be examined under

80

See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 307 P.2d 342,345 (Cal.
1962) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting rock and gravel operations that would create
appreciable quantities of dust which could injure the health of the immediate population);
Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bemardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1383-86 (N.J. 1992)
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting quarries that would pose dangers to the public safety and
environment); G.M.P. Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 457 A.2d 989, 995 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting surface mining in areas where drinking water
contamination and erosion were possible); Amerikohl Mining Inc. v Zoning Hearing Bd., 597
A.2d 219 (upholding the denial of a special exception for a surface mine operation that would
create air, noise
and water pollution affecting contiguous residential areas).
81
See East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth, 143 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ohio 1957) (striking
down an ordinance that prohibited surface mining on run-down farm land adjacent to an existing
surface mine); Frelk v. County of Kendall, 357 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (reversing
the denial of a special exception to a surface mine in agricultural area as unrelated to safety,
health or welfare); see also Herman v. Village of Hillside, 155 N.E.2d 47, 53 (I1. 1959)
(invalidating a zoning ordinance that prohibited expansion of a quarry which was adjacent to an
existing quarry).
52
See 505 U.S. at 1019.
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other decisions of the Supreme Court.83 In South Dakota Mining, the
Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance prohibited only surface mining,
but permitted all other forms of mining.'
If the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance is not a complete
devaluation of the Mining Association's property estate, cases such as
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis85 become
substantially determinative. In Keystone, the Supreme Court applied a
balancing test to determine whether the regulation constituted a taking
of property.8 6 A court must balance the extent to which the zoning
ordinance advances a legitimate state interest and the extent to which
the ordinance denies the property owner any economically viable use
of the subsurface estate. 7 In Keystone, the court held that fifty percent
of the subsurface coal left to support the surface estate was not a taking
for which just compensation was due.88 The Supreme Court reasoned
that the requirement that mining operators leave a certain percentage of
coal in the ground and take further steps to prevent damage to the
surface was designed to protect a wide variety of public and private
uses of the surface estate. 89 In addition, even with the mining operator
taking only fifty percent of the coal reserve, it was still profitable for
the company to remove the coal. 90 The Court refused to find that a
statute requiring a percentage of coal to remain in the ground was a
physical appropriation of coal. 9' In Keystone, the Supreme Court held
that the test for regulatory taking requires the Court to compare the
value of the property that can be taken to the value of what is left in the
ground.92 The Court concluded that the statute promoted a significant
public interest and resulted in only a slight diminution in value of the
mining operator's operations, and thus no taking had occurred.93
The question for Lawrence County was therefore whether the
Mining Association could obtain the coal by other economically
feasible means. If the Mining Association cannot access their minerals
83See id. at n.8.
84 See South Dakota Mining Ass n, 155 F.3d at 1007.
85480 U.S. 470 (1987).
86See id. at 485 (adopting the balancing test proscribed in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255,260 (1980)).
87
See id.

88See id at 498.
89See id. at 495-97.
9
°see id. at 496.
91See id. at 498.
92
See id. at 501-505.
93See id.
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through the surface and have no other way to access the estate, then the
property right becomes a nullity and hence a taking.' If other means of
extraction are possible, then the courts will weigh all of the public and
private interests involved. Furthermore, the court could consider the
amount of coal the Mining Association may obtain with what would be
left in the ground.
III. NUISANCE LAW
There are two distinct types of nuisances: private and public. 9
They have many similar aspects in that each causes an inconvenience
to someone. However, private nuisance is narrowly restricted to the
invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land as it pertains to the
individual landowners or a small group of people. 96 A public nuisance
incorporates this same principle, but the number of people affected by
the proposed nuisance must be greater.97 The courts have not said
exactly how many people are needed to constitute a 'public'; thus, it is
often determined judicially. The remedy for a private nuisance rests in
the hands of the private landowners in Lawrence County whose rights
have been disturbed. The remedy for public nuisance rests in the hands
of the state or the segment of the public that is directly affected by the
proposed nuisance. Whether a public or private nuisance, nothing
happens until a landowner brings this type of action. 98
Other jurisdictions have already declared that the possibility of
future injury to property is enough to bring a nuisance action. 99 South
Dakota has not addressed this possible nuisance action in state or
district court; however in Kuper v. Lincoln- Union Elec. Co.,' 00 the court

94See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992).
has
attempted to remedy the all-or-nothing approach. H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 203 (1995).
Congress
95A third type of nuisance is absolute nuisance which exists in situations that result
from abnormal and unduly hazardous activities. See Northwest Water Corp. v. Pennetta, 479 P.2d
398, 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
96See Cox v. Ray M. Lee Co., Ill S.E.2d 246,248 (Ga. 1959); Allison v. Smith, 695
P.2d 791, 793-94 (Colo. App. 1984); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-10-1 (Michie 1999)
(describing 97nuisances).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2- 10-3 (Michie 1999) ("A public nuisance is one which

affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons"). 98See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 (F) cmt. c (1965).
99See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 181 F.R.D. 473, 485 (D. Colo. 1998); Adkins v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (1992).
100557 N.W.2d 748 (S.D. 1996).
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specifically made reference to a jury instruction describing a nuisance
as an act which "renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of
property."' 0 ' From this case, it could be inferred that South Dakota
courts view future nuisance as a legitimate cause of action.
Even if the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance deprives the
Mining Association of all beneficial use of the property, a taking will
not necessarily be found. The inquiry of whether the zoning ordinance
has the effect of depriving the subsurface property owners of all
beneficial use of their land must be case specific." 2 If the proposed use
is one which the Mining Association has no legal right to make in the
first place, for example, it amounts to a nuisance. Thus the local
government need not pay compensation. This reasoning originates from
the common law expression sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcedas, which
means "property may not be used in a manner injurious to the property
of another."'0 3
Although in certain cases courts have held that surface mining
constitutes a common law nuisance, more often courts have seen
surface mining as a legitimate business and have not viewed it as a
nuisance per se." ° It is well established that mining is a lawful and
necessary business and a reasonable use of property. However, surface
mining may become a nuisance by reason of the manner in which it is
carried out.'0 5
If the mining is executed in an injurious manner, then it is a
nuisance. This injurious manner must be an interference that is
substantial, unreasonable, and offensive or inconvenient to a reasonable
person. Any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount
to a nuisance. Land use ordinances, such as the Lawrence County
Zoning Ordinance, may in this respect legitimately circumscribe an
activity that amounts to a public nuisance. 0 6
Public nuisance extends to virtually any form of annoyance or
inconvenience interfering with common public rights. This could
include not only tourism in the Black Hills National Forest but also the
public that drives along the roads within the area. The remedy for
'0'Id. at 763. See also S.D. Codified Laws § 21-10-1 (Michie 1999) (stating that acts
or the failure to perform certain acts, which render other persons insecure in life or in the use of
their property, constitute nuisances).
102See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
10 3See Canfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522 (1897).
'O'See
53A AM. JUR. 2d Mines and Minerals § 338 (1997).
105See id.
'°6 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.16 (2d ed. 1988).
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public nuisances rests in the hands of the public at large, whose rights
have been inconvenienced.
The private surface landowners in South Dakota Mining may
bring a private nuisance action before the surface mining has begun. A
threat of future injury may be enough to constitute an interference with
the enjoyment of land.'0 7 In addition, depreciation in the value of the
property because of such conditions or activities may constitute
sufficient present damage upon which an action may be based.' 0 8 The
private landowners in Lawrence County living in close proximity to the
potential surface mines may use the private nuisance action against the
Mining Association before surface mining begins in the Black Hills
National Forest.
If private landowners in Lawrence County try to stop surface
mining on grounds of nuisance, and the zoning ordinance denies all
economically productive use of the land by the Mining Association,
then courts will sustain the action only if "background principles of
nuisance and property law" would proscribe the use.'0 9 With surface
mining declared off limits, the Mining Association must receive just
compensation unless they could have been enjoined in a state common
law public or private nuisance action.'' 0
Courts have established that surface mining operations can rise
to the level of common law nuisances if excessive smoke, fumes or dust
are produced, or if noise and vibrations from equipment or blasting
disturb the peace."' Other factors include water pollution, erosion,
landslides, and the release of noxious gases." 2 Surface mining may
also be prohibited as a security risk if it gets close to houses or

1°7See Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 255 S.W. 1046 (Ky. 1923) (referring to
stored explosives as a nuisance); Richardson v. Murphy, 259 P.2d 116 (Or. 1953) (calling an

inflammable building a nuisance).
0

11 8See Romano v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 62 So. 677 (Ala. 1913).
09Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). Three

justices disapproved the Court's narrowing of the nuisance exception to common law only. Justice
Kennedy was troubled because only common law, not legislatively declared nuisances now come
under the exception.
See id. at 1017 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
t 0
See id. at 1016.
"'See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 345
(Cal. 1962) (holding that dust created by rock and gravel operation could be a nuisance); see also
53A AM. JUR.
112 2d Mines and Minerals § 339 (1997).
See Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 597 A.2d 219, 223 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding water, noise, and air pollution caused by coal surface mining
constituted a nuisance); see also 53A AM. JUR. 2d Mines and Minerals § 339 (1996).
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schools." 3 Furthermore, the extensive state and federal environmental
controls, to which surface mines are often subject, do not determine
whether a mine is a nuisance or are merely additional factors in the
equation.14
Most people familiar with the process would agree that surface
mining is ugly, and most do not want to live anywhere near such
operations. Not only is it disturbing to residential plans, but also to
tourism. For example, there are currently movements to prohibit surface
mining based on the argument that tourism will be adversely affected.' 5
Critics compare the cost of losing tourism dollars to the cost of losing
mining dollars. This can be a highly effective means of prohibiting
surface mining - if the economics are balanced, then the chances of
strip mining being considered a nuisance are greatly increased.
To reiterate, the common law principle of nuisance can be
utilized to deter surface mining, but it should be used only as a last
resort. Nuisance is, at best, a piecemeal remedy to a problem. Who is
likely to win will largely depend upon the economics of the area." 6 The
very existence of a private nuisance depends on a balancing of the
rights of the persons involved. Relief of an injunctive nature always
involves a further balancing of equities to determine whether an
extreme remedy is justified." 7
IV. CONCLUSION

In order to determine whether the Lawrence County Zoning
Ordinance will stand, the first question to be addressed is that of federal
preemption. It can conclusively be established that federal law will not
preempt the zoning ordinance. As the laws in South Dakota indicate,
state law will not preempt the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance. In
fact, South Dakota state laws seem to agree with and support the zoning
ordinance. Thus the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance is likely to
survive the preemption question.

" 3See Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bemardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1384
(N.J. 1992)- Kane v. Kreiter, 195 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ohio 1963).
114See 53A AM. JUR. 2d Mines and Minerals § 338
(1996).
115See Charles Winfrey, Citizens Fight Strip Mine, THE PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 1998 at
16.
116See Royal C. Gardner, Bankingon Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking,
and Takings,781 IOWA L. REV. 527, xx (1996).
" See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 602-06 (4th ed. 1971).
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The next question is if the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance
survives preemption, does it amount to a taking of the Mining
Association's subsurface mineral estate? Lawrence County's Zoning
Ordinance restricts surface mining but not subsurface mining, so one
must study the options available to the Mining Association, including
any additional costs of subsurface mining. If the subsurface mining
option is impractical, the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance might
rise to the level of a taking for which the Mining Association could
seek compensation. Conversely, if the Mining Association can retrieve
a portion of the coal by using subsurface mining techniques, then there
would be no taking. No matter if there is a partial or complete
diminution of property value to the Mining Association, the state must
show some legitimate interest in discontinuing the surface mining.
The final question presented is, in the event the Lawrence
County Zoning Ordinance does arise to the level of a taking and is
struck down, whether the private landowners can use the common law
action of nuisance to prevent their land from being surface mined.
Nuisance is always a risky action, but as a last resort it could save the
landowners' property. Based upon the political and economic climate
of the area, the nuisance action would probably fail.
The Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance is symbolic of the
change in society's attitude toward mining companies. Society is
becoming more concerned with environmental protections, against not
only governments but also powerful companies. As time passes, it will
become more difficult for mining companies to mine on land that is not
federally owned, unless they are willing to pay higher and higher prices
to obtain the surface estates.

